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THE BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF AUGUSTINE'S

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

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April, 1961

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Introduction

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study of the content of Augustine's philosophy of history from the perspective of the Greek philosophical development and the contribution of the Roman ethos.

I seek in the First Part of the thesis to explore the radical break Augustine makes with the philosophical past with his interpretation of the Christian doctrine of creation. In addition, I explore the fact of Augustine's thought about history in terms of the peculiar Roman ethos seeking answers to the questions of _why_ he wrote about history at all as well as the question of _what_ he made of the meaning of history.

The Second Part of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of the content of Augustine's historical thought. The implication of the second part is that the content of Augustine's philosophy of history is meaningful only in terms of the material presented and the question raised in the first part.

The conclusion attempts a brief summary of Augustine's philosophy of history seeking, along the lines suggested by C.N. Cochrane, to present in general terms the over-all achievement Augustine has made to our understanding of the idea of history.

I. - PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE - The Philosophical Background, 'Space' and 'Time'

It is the purpose of this first chapter to consider aspects of the
philosophical background relevant to Augustine's theology of history. By
this philosophical consideration we intend to provide a dimension of depth
not only to the understanding of Augustine's perspective on history as such,
but also as this perspective compares and contrasts to those of the ancient
world of which Augustine is the last great representative at least philo-
sophically.

.In order to bring form from the mass of philosophical material of the
ancient world and to focus on the concept of the historical we will employ
the metaphors of 'Space' and 'Time' and their relation.[1] The metaphors of
'Space' and 'Time' are, in this discussion, used symbolically. The metaphor
'Space' will be used to represent structures of existence which are static,
or fixed and which suggest shape or pattern. The metaphor 'Time' will be
used to suggest elements which tend to break up or change the fixed and
static structures of existence. Thus the two metaphors 'Space' and 'Time'
will be used in relation to one another in this discussion.

The general thesis of this chapter is two-fold. First we will show that
in practically all examples throughout ancient western thought, 'Space'
dominates 'Time' or enclosed 'Time' within itself, metaphorically speaking,
while in Augustine's view of history, 'Space' and 'Time' have an equal
ontological status. Second, this discussion will indicate in passing, the
main aspects of Augustine's historical thought where the relation of 'Space'
and 'Time' are expressed so that their tension and conflict may be noted and

understood when his main ideas about history are described in part two of this essay.

The profound influence of Homer's _Odyssey_ throughout the Greek history suggests it as the first example of the subordinate place of 'Time' to 'Space' in Greek thought. Let us approach the epic with the question of the significance of the dramatic action which it contains. This question, as a guide, penetrates into the inner logic of the work since by it we discern the fact that the free and responsible action of the characters is throughout and in every case subordinate to two themes or leit-motives which define the essential quality of the work. These two themes are first, the way the exploits of Odysseus are used to exemplify heroic virtues such as cunning, bravery, pride, and athletic prowess; second, the oscillating changes of Odysseus' history from safety to danger, glory to humiliation, and from happiness to sadness.[2]

These two themes or leit-motives which persist in contrapuntal fashion throughout the _Odyssey_ represent static or fixed elements which are opposed but never overcome by elements of personal freedom or the exercise of choice. by the heroes of the epic.[2] Using the term 'Space' as a metaphor for these static or fixed elements of the epic and 'Time' as a metaphor for the subordinate elements, it is at once clear how 'Time' is subordinate to 'Space' throughout the epic.

In Hesiod's _Works and Days_ we observe another clear example of the subordination of 'Time' to 'Space'. Hesiod's view of the five stages of history is a particularly good example since the relation of 'Space' and 'Time' are completely unambiguous. According to Hesiod the five periods of man's history were the gold, silver, copper, heroic, and iron ages.[3] These ages succeeded one another in time, each being a less happy era, with an increase of woes until the next and worst age which is to come. For our

purposes, the essential thing to note about Hesiod's concept of the five ages
is that each age comes to an end and is destroyed before the next age begins.
Schematically represented the five ages would appear as a descending broken
line, where each age is a free-standing mural so to speak. Such a schematic
representation illustrates clearly how fixed, static patterns subordinate the
forward process of the five ages, and is an excellent example of how 'Space'
dominates 'Time' in Hesiod's idea of history. The only opposition to this
domination of 'Space' in Hesiod appears in the conception of the decreasing
happiness of each age which does suggest a counter-acting power or ontological
status of the 'Time' element. But the opposing force of the 'Time' element
against the 'Space' element is vitiated because there is no cause-effect
relationship from one Age to the next.

Turning to the speculation of the Pre-Socratic philosophers we observe
the foundation of all the elements of cosmological analysis which will determine
the thought of the great Hellenic and Hellenistic philosophers until Augustine
who breaks radically with his predecessors in the fundamental relation
between 'Space' and 'Time'. So little is known of the ramifications of the
thought of the Milesian school that it is difficult to even hazard an analysis
of 'Space' and 'Time' in their thought. ~~Suffice to say~~ Briefly we may that for Thales and
Anaximenes, at least, the ground of reality was material; for Thales, water,
and Anaximenes, eternal and boundless air. For these two philosophers,
therefore, a fixed and static substance was the substrate of change and thus
of motion which is the measure of time. In the sense that static substance,
or 'Space' was the substrate of change or 'Time' and thus ontologically prior
to it, metaphorically speaking 'Space' dominated 'Time' in the thought of
these two philosophers.

In the case of Pythagoras the domination of 'Space' to 'Time' is expressed
by his idea of numerical proportionality as the fundamental characteristic

of all being and becoming. In contrast to Thales and Anaximenes, the fixed

and static substrate of being was not material, but conceptual, and thus

'Space' in Pythagoras is the equilibrium of proportion and balance. Therefore

in analyzing Pythagoras in terms of our metaphor of 'Space' and 'Time' it is

more accurate to say that 'Space' in the sense of numerical proportion

enclosed_ becoming or 'Time' within itself.

Turning next to the speculations of the Eleatic philosophers we observe

the most unambiguous examples of the subordination of 'Time' to 'Space' in

all of Pre-Socratic thought. For Xenophanes, the metaphor 'Space' is

represented by that which is the substrate of all being, Nous, which is immutable

and eternal. The metaphor 'Time' represents the idea in Xenophanes that all

motion arises from Nous which is ontologically prior. Thus, in a way perhaps

prophetic of Parmenides, 'Space' is ontologically prior to 'Time', thereby

dominating it.[4]

In Heraclitus we come to a Pre-Socratic many of whose fragments describe

change and becoming, or metaphorically, 'Time', as the substrate of all reality.[5]

Such a conception, a-typical of the whole Pre-Socratic tradition, suggests

a radical break in the relation of 'Space' and 'Time' described thus far. But

just when it appears in Greek philosophy that 'Time' is ontologically prior

to and dominates 'Space' we recognize the fact that other Heraclitean fragments[6]

make it clear that change and becoming itself is subject to a higher harmony,

an equilibrium of opposites, such that in a manner analogous to Pythagoras,

'Space' encloses 'Time' within itself.

In the thought of Parmenides we observe both the most influential of

the Pre-Socratics for classical Greek philosophy and the clearest example

of the domination of 'Time'by 'Space'. For Parmenides, the ultimately

real is Being which is eternal, immutable, and motionless.[7] By the principle

of Identity whereby Being is defined as itself, becoming represents a loss of Being and therefore has an ontologically lower status. Thus, 'Space' represented in Parmenides as Being dominates 'Time' or becoming such that 'Time' is inferior and represents the mixture of non-being with Being.

The notion of the unreality of becoming developed by Parmenides was carried to the extreme of logical absurdity in the thought of Zeno and Melissus who denied the reality of 'Time' altogether. It was in response to the absurdity of these systems that compromise systems arose. None of these systems, however much they attempted to overcome the antithesis of being and becoming, succeeded because in each case, 'Space' dominated 'Time'.

Characteristic of all these compromise systems was the denial of absolute becoming to the basic elements of being, and a recognition of a relative, becoming in the combination and separation of these basic elements in individual things. Thus, as in the case of/Milesians, Xenophanes, and Parmenides, becoming or 'Time' is, at best, contingent upon the ontologically prior Being or according to our metaphor, 'Space'. This is seen in Empedocles' idea of four basic elements which participate in becoming, but remain always the same.[8] Also the domination of 'Space' over 'Time' is further represented in Empedocles' idea of the regular oscillation between the poles of the One and the Many brought about by the forces of love and strife.[9]

For the atomists, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Leucippus, being or 'Space' is represented by the innumerable, uncreated, imperishable, immutable particles. Becoming, or 'Time' is for each philosopher contingent upon either the unequal weight of the particles themselves as in Democritus, or caused by the immaterial Nous, which creates an external circular pattern of movement of the particles in to the system of Anaxagoras. Thus, whether 'Space' is represented by the immutable elements of Empedocles, or the imperishable and immutable particles of Democritus or the pattern of circularity in the

movement of the particles for Anaxagoras, 'Time' is in all cases subordinated in these compromise systems which represent the end of the pre-Socratic development.

The description of Parmenides' thought in terms of the metaphor 'Space and Time' provides the necessary background for understanding Plato from the perspective of our discussion. We need only describe two elements of Plato's cosmological thought, first the relation of being and becoming; and the meaning of time.

First, as did Parmenides, Plato considered the ground or the ultimate basis of reality as Being. Being for Plato consisted in the transcendent world of Forms or Ideas. In the context of this discussion it is not necessary to discuss the implications of the passages in the later dialogues where Plato suggests the Form of the One or the Good as that which unites all the other Forms. Suffice to say that the Forms or Ideas were the patterns for all existing things, and only as existing individual things participated in an eternal, immutable Form, did it exist at all. We may use 'Space', then, to metaphorically represent this uncreated, immutable and eternal world of Forms or Ideas. Becoming or change exists in the world fashioned according to the Forms by the "Demiurge" only because of the presence of the mass of chaos which the divine Ideas 'inform' to fashion existing things. Thus, in existing things, according to Plato, there is a constant tension between the informing power of the Ideas, which give structure and order to all that is, and the primal Receptacle of these Forms which is constantly tending to disintegrate and vitiate the informing power of the Ideas and produce chaos. From this, it is clear that Plato considers becoming or change as derived from this primordal chaos or Receptacle of the transcendent Forms, and thus becoming is a negative entity promoting non-being in existing things. Returning to the metaphor of 'Time' we may note how 'Time', in Plato's thought representing

the power to promote non-being, is distinctly subordinate and inferior to 'Space' representing the transcendent world of Forms. In Parmenides as in Plato, therefore 'Space' has a more fundamental ontological status than 'Time'.

A second element of Plato's cosmological thought which illustrates the domination of 'Space' over 'Time' is his description of the meaning of   , time. According to the mythical description of the making of the world contained in Plato's Timaeus, the Demiurge desired to make the visible world as much, as possible like its eternal, transcendent pattern. However, as already described, eternality, the prime characteristic of the Forms, cannot be conferred upon the generated world, so the Demiurge did the next best thing and "took to make, as it were, a moving likeness of eternity; and at the same time that he ordered the Heaven, he made, of eternity that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness moving according to number - that to which we have given the name time."[10] In terms of the present discussion, the significance of this passage is Plato's desire to make time, that entity which measures change, which we metaphorically represent by 'Time' as much like eternity in unity, which we metaphorically have called 'Space', as possible. Here is a striking example in Plato of the way 'Space' seeks to enclose 'Time' within itself, metaphorically speaking.

In the philosophy of Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, there did not exist the hiatus between the ungenerated world of forms and the generated world of becoming. Therefore, because the Forms did not exist in a transcendent realm apart from matter in Aristotle, it is worth mentioning how even here form or 'Space' dominates matter or 'Time'. This is so since for Aristotle the forms were the agent not only of the goal of becoming, the teleological end of the informing of matter, but were also the cause which worked from

behind, so to speak, to bring matter from the state of pure potentiality to pure actuality. Thus again, the form, or metaphorically, 'Space' is the dominant element which is the ground or substrate of becoming, or, as we have called it, 'Time'.

In considering the 'Space-Time' relationship in ancient thought we come next to the doctrines of classical stoicism. Two doctrines of this school are relevant for our study, the ideas of the Conflagration and the Great Year.

The doctrine of the Conflagration was characteristic of the Old Stoa, but not novel to it. Its source was probably the writings of Democritus who envisioned the continuous creation and destruction of worlds due to the combination and separation of atoms, the smallest elements of reality. The Conflagration can be described in the following terms: the fiery stuff which is the underlying substance of all life gives rise to substances of increasing density (in the order of air, water, earth). In this 'downward' movement of the Fiery Substance the cosmos is created and life in all its forms appears. During the 'upward' movement of the Fiery Substance, however, all the cosmos returns to its primal state by a process of disintegration. This process is described as being measured by the Great Year. The Great Year is the length of time from each new creation of the world until its subsequent destruction. During the course of each cosmic cycle or διάστημα the heavens rotate periodically so that their relative positions are identical at the beginning and end of each cosmic cycle. This means that for the Old Stoa the world was in one sense, perishable. But because the Fiery Substance from which the cosmos is generated still exists, the eternality of the universe was, in fact, held. Diogenes Laertes writes describing the Stoic position:

> "The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape,
> such a shape being the most suitable for motion. Time too is incorporeal
> being the measure of the worlds motion. And time past and time future

are infinite, but time present is finite. They hold that the universe must come to an end, inasmuch as it had a beginning, on the analogy of those things which are understood by the senses. And that of which the parts are perishable is perishable as a whole. Now the parts of the world are perishable, seeing that they are transformed one into the other. Therefore the world itself is doomed to perish."[11]

Sextus Empiricus writing about 180 A.D. describes the Stoic view of time as: "the interval of the motion of the universe."[12]

These quotations and the description above of the Stoic doctrines of Conflagration and the Great Year provide the necessary elements illustrative of how in classical Stoicism 'Space' dominated 'Time.' As in the thought of Empedocles, so in Stoicism there exists a fixed and static pattern which never changes. For Stoicism this fixed pattern is the διάστημα, the period between the creation and destruction of worlds, the duration of the Great Year. In our metaphorical terminology this 'Space' element, in all cases, determines the nature of the process of creation and destruction of the four basic elements, which process we may metaphorically term 'Time'. In the case of Stoicism, as in the case of Plato's thought, the metaphor 'Time' meaning any process tending to destroy static forms can be identified with time as χρόνος. Because the creative and destructive process occurring in time are caught up in the higher regularity of the διάστημα, we observe another clear example of how for classical Stoicism, as for ancient thought as a whole, 'Space' encloses 'Time' within itself.

Turning next from the Greek world before the birth of Christ to the Latin world of the first three centuries after Christ, it is clear that the influence of Plato surpasses that of all other previous philosophers. Recalling the manner in which Being in Parmenides and Plato undergirds becoming in ontological status, that 'Space' dominates 'Time', we expect and, indeed, find this to obtain in Middle and Neo-Platonic thought. A significant difference is , however, that the Supreme Form, the Good, the Beautiful of

Plato's later diologues becomes in Middle and Neo-Platonic thought more and more exalted such that in Plotinus, and perhaps also in Albinus, the Supreme God is beyond Being and essence, is ineffable, and the Divine Ideas become the highest beings. In Albinus, one had to rise above all Universals to find Deity, thus the Deity, or δ πρῶτος ροῦς was abstracted from both the supra- and sublunary worlds. With this great exaltation of the Deity even the opposition between what we have called 'Space' and 'Time' no longer involves the Deity since Deity is now beyond all Being and Becoming; Deity is ineffable and unthinkable only to be known by mystical union. In Plotinus, the Deity was τόὃν , Unity, which was beyond Being and Becoming and also to be known only through mystical experience.

It is the Divine Ideas, therefore, which are the first Beings for Middle and Neo-Platonism and the manner in which 'Space' dominates 'Time' in these philosophies becomes the way in which the Divine Ideas possess ontological priority in the hierarchy of being that comprise the cosmological speculation of these systems.

In Albinus, the Deity or δ πρῶτος ροῦς is the First Cause and it causes the Heavenly Mind when united with the World Soul is able to call from potentiality to actuality the World Body or the supra-lunary world. The World Body itself was called forth from Matter, a chaos and source of all becoming. Thus Matter, for Albinus represents what we have called 'Time' and depends for its very existence on the Highest Beings, the Heavenly Mind, which as the Platonic Forms, we have called 'Space'. The domination of 'Space' over 'Time' in Albinus as a representative Middle Platonist is thus obvious.

In Neo-Platonism the development of the hierarchy of Being and the theory of the First God, the Divine Intellect or Divine Ideas, and the World Soul is maintained.As already mentioned, the First God was beyond Being and

Becoming for Albinus as well as Plotinus. A difference exists, however, in
their conceptions of the relation of the Divine Mind, to the First God. For
Albinus, the First God thought only of itself in Aristotelian fashion, not
of the Heavenly Mind which thought upon all there was. For Plotinus the First
God, τὸ ὄν , is beyond even thinking of itself, and thus differs in kind from
the First Mind of Middle Platonism. Consequently, there is a hiatus between
τὸ ὄν of Plotinus and the Divine Mind which does not exist between the
Primal Mind and the Heavenly Mind of Albinus. For Plotinus, the Divine Mind,
the highest Being in the hierarchy of being, consists of, not τὸ ὄν , but
the World of Forms, though the Divine Mind does seek union with τὸ ὄν by
ecstatic contemplation.

In Plotinus, Soul is the link between the Divine Mind and the material
world. This is analogous to the place of the World Soul in Albinus and Plato.
In Plotinus, the World Soul is divided into two parts, the Higher which
contemplates the World of Forms, the Divine Mind, and the lower which is
co-terminous with the material world. The function of this World Soul is to
give life to the material world. Just as the Divine Mind is the product of
the inexhaustible fecundity of Being emanating from τὸ ὄν is beyond Being,
and as the Divine Mind retains its power to Be from adhering to τὸ ὄν and
seeking comprehension of it through ecstatic union, so the Divine Mind emanates
the World Soul, the higher part of which depends for its Being upon the Divine
Mind, while the lower part gives life and motion to the material world. It
is as if the Soul were not content to observe the Perfection of the Divine Mind
but sought out of a fecundity of Being deriving from the great Chain of Being
itself to produce a universe which would contain multiplicity and succession,
but by its order and temporal succession, especially the regular revolution
of the heavenly bodies, to imitate the eternal realm as far as this was possible
in the world of change.

From this it becomes clear that the source of becoming, change and time is the involvement of the lower World Soul with the world of matter. Given this involvement, and recalling that the World Soul gives motion to the material world, we may say that becoming or time is the very life of the soul or that the mode of the Soul's life is becoming or time.

Recalling the basic supposition of Plotinianism, and for Platonism generally, that the perfection of Being seeps downward in less perfect ways, it is clear how we may say that 'Space' overcomes 'Time' in Plotinus. In a manner very similar to Albinus, the Divine Mind which is perfect, infinite and eternally self-contained is the basis, through the World Soul, of becoming. Hence, it is clear that for Plotinus, the Divine Mind is ontologically prior to the World Soul, or translated into our metaphorical terminology, 'Space' dominates 'Time' as has been the case throughout the whole Greek philosophical development.

We come finally to Augustine who represents the last great figure of ancient philosophy. It is the thesis of this first chapter to show that Augustine broke radically with his philosophical past and that for him 'Space' and 'Time' had an equal ontological status. The way whereby this is possible in Augustine while it is not in his predecessors is the use Augustine makes of the Christian doctrine of Creation. It is this doctrine alone which enables Augustine to provide a philosophical understanding of the 'Space'-'Time' relationship such that neither overcomes the other. In seeing in the Christian doctrine of Creation the equal ontological status of 'Space' and 'Time' Augustine not only was able to succeed in formulating a philosophy whereby man's life was united as it had never been done before in Greek thought, but also there was made possible the establishment of ultimate meaning for the 'Space-Time' process i.e. history—again something that had never occurred before in Greek thought.

As has already been demonstrated, 'Time', that element which tends to break up the fixed or static structures of existence, was always 'dominated' or enclosed by 'Space' which we have used as a metaphor for the fixed, or static patterns of existence. We may describe this fact in symbolical way, if we say that 'Time' in a sense, never had a chance inasmuch as the element of becoming was always ontologically inferior to the element of Being as in Parmenides or the Platonic tradition generally. Or when it appeared occasionally in the history of Greek thought that "Time", the element of becoming, did have the power to oppose 'Space' successfully as in the thought of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, or the classical Stoa, we see how 'Time' was finally overcome by 'Space' appearing in the form of a higher pattern or equilibrium which neutralized the ontological power of 'Time' by enclosing it within itself.

Utilizing the Christian doctrine of Creation, however, Augustine succeeded in conceiving existence in such a way that the element of becoming or, for Augustine, historical time was created or began along with the 'heavens and the earth'. When Augustine's doctrine of Creation is given in fuller detail in chapter three this will be seen. Suffice to say that for Augustine the phrase, 'In the Beginning' meant for one thing--the first moment of time. Thus, for Augustine, Time had a place equal to 'Space' in human existence. This will become clearer when it is seen how Augustine used the word Beginning, not only to mean the first moment of time, but also as the Divine Mind or Christ. This aspect of Augustine's thought shows his clear influence by the Platonist tradition. For Augustine, as for Neo-Platonism, the Divine Mind consisting of the Platonic Forms was a divine entity. Like other Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries Augustine equated the Divine Mind and its Platonic Forms, with the Second Member of the Trinity, an equation which

Augustine mistakenly thought the Prologue to the Gospel of John had done.
For Augustine to read in Genesis that 'in the beginning God created the heaven
and earth' and to make a Platonic interpretation upon it was natural and
automatic. By interpreting the word 'beginning' as the Son, the Divine
Wisdom in whom are all Forms, and in whom and through whom these Forms bring
existing things out of matter or nothingness, Augustine describes the static'
structures of existence we have metaphorically described as 'Space'. By this
double significance which Augustine attributes to the word 'Beginning' we
observe the way in which Augustine was able to employ the Christian doctrine
of creation ex nihilo in such a way that 'Space' and 'Time' had an equal
ontological status. With this equal status the most profound effects occur
in consideration of the meaning of existence. It meant theologically for
Augustine that the Infinite God could create finite man, it meant that the
idea of a meaningful historical process was conceivable, also it meant that
man's total existence in the dimension of the historical process was not alien
to the purposes of the eternal, immutable Godhead. Finally it meant that the
whole created order, the direction of the historical process, but especially,
man, the highest being in the dimensions of 'Space' and 'Time', could bear
the 'image' of their maker, and in this way man could recognize his maker for
Whom He was, and see the vestiges of His Nature in the created order around
him. It is, of course, the content of Augustine's historical thought which
is the subject of this essay, and thus these other areas will have to be
overlooked. But it was the doctrine of Creation ex nihilo, distinctly
Christian, that Augustine employed in his radical break from his Greek
philosophical heritage.

Theologically or philosophically speaking such a radical break from his
philosophical heritage was very difficult and the tension of this break appears

throughout his writings. Constantly we see how 'Space', as ontological analysis tends to overcome 'Time' in the form of human choice and freedom in the analysis of the Fall. The tension appears dramatically as Augustine takes great pains to reject the several Hellenic and Hellenistic theories that would destroy the purposeful direction of the historical process by enclosing the process ('Time') in periodic cycles ('Space') thereby removing from the 'Time' dimension any essential meaning. In these and other ways which will be apparent in chapters three and four of this essay, the tendency of 'Space' to dominate 'Time' is apparent in Augustine's writing about history. The significant thing is not that this tension should exist, but the extent to which it exists at all indicates the profundity of his break from his classical heritage in this crucial aspect of his thought.

In concluding this introductory chapter it is necessary to consider, if only briefly, the concepts of the two Cities, the Heavenly and the earthly. In the light of Augustine's immersion in Platonic thought these two concepts doubtless took on the nature of metaphysical realities, reminiscent of the eternal Forms, of which the earthly manifestations are mere shadows by comparison. However, Maritain has well pointed out that Augustine's high evaluation of the meaning of the historical process made it possible to consider the two cities metaphysically while at the same time showing an astute understanding of the political and social realities which determined the nature of the two Cities and their mutual relation. Whether Augustine derived his concepts of the Two Cities from the Donatist Tyconious and mollified the latter's realistic eschatology as Maritain[13] suggests, or whether both Augustine and Tyconious derive their ideas from the Scriptures, as Barrow[14] suggests, the tension between the Transcendent entities and their historical manifestation, which we will consider in chapters three and four, provide another illustration of the 'Space-Time' tension which has been the subject of this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO — The Roman Contribution

I.

In a previous chapter the philosophic background of the Greco-Roman world was discussed with its relevance for Augustine's theology, in particular, his theology of history. In this chapter the scope of the discussion is somewhat narrower. The area under investigation, now, is the peculiarly Roman ethos and its relevance for Augustine's City of God. The particular element upon which the following discussion centers is the Roman political ethos, or more exactly, the peculiar Roman sense of political destiny, and its implications for Augustine's City of God.

The fact that Roman culture after the republic, and Greek culture differed in many aspects has been always recognized by classical scholars. These differences have been symbolized in the phrase "Greco-Roman" which indicates that during the first two or three centuries after the Principate of Augustus Caesar a blend of different elements was taking place as the Empire expanded, forming provinces in what had previously been the Hellenistic culture inaugurated by the military and culture conquests of Alexander the Great. However, some of the latest classical scholarship appears to suggest that the positive and peculiarly Roman contribution to this amalgam has not been properly recognized, or at best has been underestimated. Previous scholarship seems to have assigned to Roman culture the task of receiving the Hellenistic culture and devaluated, perhaps, the transforming nature of this reception by the Romans.

Thus, for example, in treating the peculiar conservation of Roman social thought generally, Samuel Dill, writing in 1904 concludes: "There is nothing

more striking in the social history of Rome than the inveterate conservatism
of Roman sentiment in the face of accomplished change. Such moral rigidity
is almost necessarily prone to pessimism. The Golden Age lies in the past:
the onward sweep of society seems always to be moving toward the abyss."[1]

This comment, although true as far as it goes, falls short of seeing
why the Romans were set adamantly against social change. The question of
why this "inveterate conservatism" is not raised by Dill, and certainly not
answered, even implicitly by him in this volume.

Turning, however, to a modern work in the Roman ethos, the new interest
in the peculiar contribution of Roman culture taken by modern scholarship
is clearly seen. The following passage taken from R.H. Barrow's The Romans
illustrates a new appreciation and understanding of the peculiarly Roman
ethos. Barrow writes: "From the earliest days of Rome we can detect in
the Roman a sense of dedication, at first crude and inarticulate and by no
means unaccompanied by fear. In later days, it is clearly expressed and is
often a mainspring of action. This is the clue to Roman character and to
Roman history."[2] Barrow goes on to supply the cause of this peculiarly
Roman sense of "dedication" and "subordination". In particular he relates it
to the ethos of Roman religion and historical destiny. He writes: The Roman
tended to think of religion in terms of history, and history was the history
of Rome. For the individual there was little of personal appeal; he had the
feeling that he was somehow incorporated into the state which in some in-
comprehensible way had relations with the divine powers which were behind
its history and destiny; moreover, it was desirable that he should keep on the
right side of the many Gods who formed the spiritual background which his own
life was enacted, and that he should put himself in line of their activities
or purposes."[3] Thus it is Barrow's thesis, and the thesis of this paper,

that the peculiarly Roman ethos was characterized by this sense of "dedication"
and "subordination" and intimately related to Roman religion and a belief in
Rome's historic destiny. In addition, it seems clear, that even when Roman
writers used Greek and Hellenistic categories and forms of expression they
filled them with a new meaning, the peculiarly Roman sense of "subordination"
and religio-historical destiny.

For the remainder of this first section,I will try to illustrate this
peculiarly Roman ethos by an analysis of Cicero's De Re Publica, and
Vergil's Aeneid.

II. De Re Publica and the Aeneid

A. Implicitly and occasionally, explicitly, the De Re Publica is inspired
by Plato's Republic. The setting during a festival, and the participants—
a number of eminent Romans discussing the structure of society is,
reminiscent of Plato. However, this use of Greek Dialogue, although it is
the form of Cicero's work, has a characteristically Roman content. The
enduring themes of the peculiarly Roman ethos described above are clearly
visible in the work. These themes will now be illustrated with the intention
of having them represent the best of Roman political thought in the last
decades of the Republic.

The first theme to be considered is the rejection by Cicero of those
elements of Greek philosophical thought which would devaluate active par-
ticipation in political and social affairs. Such a view was fostered by the
Epicureans who held the view that an active public life would upset the
calm, collected life of the philosopher who sought above all else, detachment
and equilibrium from the life of struggle and strife. At the very beginning
of his work, Cicero denounces the Epicureans in the following manner "....
so I believe that those who rule such cities by wise counsel and authority
are to be deemed far superior, even in wisdom, to those who take no part at

all in the business of government. And since we feel a mighty urge to increase the resources of mankind, since we desire to make human life safer and richer by our thought and effort, and are goaded by Nature herself, let us hold to the course which has ever been that of all excellent men, turning deaf ears to those who, in the hope of even recalling those who have already gone ahead, are sounding the retreat."[4]

Here it might be well to pause and notice two subsidiary elements in the passage. The first is the role of purpose and destiny of the political enterprise namely, the desire "to make human life safer and richer by our thought and effort". This theme will be encountered again and again in De Re Publica, and also in the Aeneid. The other point to be noticed is the use of the word "Nature" by Cicero. Critics of the De Re Publica agree that a strong Stoic influence is present in the political thinking of Cicero and Scipio Africanus. It is important to note that this Stoic influence comes to the Romans through the Middle-Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius. Both of these writers contributed the Stoic doctrine of the brotherhood of all men, united by the common element of the Divine Spark of Reason. It is of interest to note how Cicero employs this Stoic element, passing over the Stoic cosmological significance, in support of his belief in the necessity and importance for political involvement. In the last book of the De Re Publica Cicero again employs thought forms of Middle-Stoicism, probably that of Posidonius, but again gives them a characteristically "Roman" interpretation. This element will be discussed in fuller detail later.

The second theme, that of the ultimacy of the state, is observable in the following passage, (Laelius answers Marius' question as to what is the highest knowledge of life). Laelius says: "The knowledge of those arts which can make us most useful to the State; for I consider this the noblest function of wisdom, and the highest duty of virtue as well as the best proof of its possession."[5]

A third theme to be noticed is the close relation in the Roman ethos
between religion and the state. This relation was described in the passage
quoted from R.H. Barrow and is illustrated when the contribution of Pompilius
to the making of Rome is discussed. Scipio describes the religious observance,
allegedly instituted by Pompilius—"the greater auspices, two augers, five
pontiffs in charge of religious rites, religious ceremonial, the flamens,
the Salu, and Vestal Virgins". Scipio concludes the life of Pompilius
in the following manner: "Thus, when he had reigned for thirty-nine years
in complete peace and harmony..., he died, after having established the
two elements which most conspicuously contribute to the stability of a
State-religion and the spirit of tranquility."[6]

Next, two more quotations from De Re Publica will be given to illustrate
the Romans' reverence of the past in terms of Rome's political greatness and
to show how virtue is described in the context of political involvement. The
first is put into the mouth of Scipio by Cicero. He has Cicero say, "Yet
you will be able to realize this more easily if you watch our commonwealth
as it advances, and, by a route which we may call Nature's road (sic), finally
reaches the ideal condition. Nay, more, you will deem our ancestors' wisdom
worthy of praise for the very reason that, as you will learn, even of the
institutions borrowed from abroad, many have been improved by us until they
are much better than they were in the countries from which we obtained them
and where they had their origin. And you will learn that the Roman people have
grown great, not by chance, but by good counsel and discipline, though to
be sure fortune has favoured us also."[7]

The second passage, representing the editorializing of Cicero, shows a
characteristic reverence for the Roman past, by which the present and future
is to measured. Cicero writes, "Now it is not without a definite purpose

that I am reviewing events so ancient and remote, but I am taking my standards

of character and action to which the rest of my discourse must conform, from

distinguished men and famous periods of our own history."[8]

Finally we may turn to the sixth book of the De Re Publica and explore

more fully the point previously made about the way Cicero modifies the Middle

Stoic ideas of life after death along typically Roman lines.

Although the exact content of Posidonius' concept of the after-life is

debated, generally it is held that the Middle-Stoic view described the soul

of the sage as departing the body after death and enjoying eternal felicity

contemplating the cosmic balance and equilibrium represented by the immutable

movements of the heavenly spheres. According to Scipio, however, this eternal

felicitude comes only to those who have contributed positively and constructively

to the ongoing life of the Roman state. Scipio in the following passage

relates what he is told in his dream. He recounts: "But, Africanus, be assured

of this, so that you may be even more eager to defend the commonwealth: all

those who have preserved, aided, or enlarged their fatherland have a special

place prepared for them in the heavens, where they may enjoy a life of

happiness."[9]

B. Next let us refer briefly to the Roman political ethos as seen in

Vergil's Aeneid. This epic was of course patterned after a Greek prototype

and in an analogous way to Cicero's De Re Publica, illustrates a transformation

of the 'Space'-'Time' relation (Cf. Ch. One) which we observe in Cicero's work.

The Augustan restoration and enhancement of religious festivals and

offices themselves illustrate the close link between Roman religion and

political unity, and the deference, in name at least, to the Roman past.

In the Aeneid, we have personified the idea of a destiny for Rome which

is performed in obedience to the will of the gods, and which drives Rome onward

in the face of temptation to forsake that destiny.

In the fourth book for instance, Aeneas, personifying Rome, must reject
the love of Dido who would have Aeneas and his band stay in Carthage. This
temptation opposes directly the completion of Aeneas' journey to Italy, a
journey which symbolizes, in fact, the historic destiny of Rome itself. In
response to the plea by Dido that Aeneas remain, his final reply, the only
reply he can make, is described thus: "His heart being moved by this great
love, most deeply, and still--the gods give orders, he obeys them."[10] Later
on, in book VI, which describes Aeneas' descent into Hell, a supplement to the
above passage is given when Aeneas meets Dido, who had taken her own life
when Aeneas left her. Here Aeneas tries to tell Dido "I left your kingdom.
But the Gods' commands Driving me now through these forsaken places. This
utter night, compelled me on."[11]

Finally a superb description of the purpose of Rome, her history and
destiny is given Aeneas by his father Anchises whom he has met in Hell.
Anchises says:

> "Others, no doubt, will better mould the bronze to the semblance of
> soft breathing, draw from marble, The living countenance; and others
> plead with greater eloquence, or learn to measure, Better than we,
> the pathways of the heavens, The risings of the stars: remember
> Romans, to rule the people under law, to establish the way of Peace,
> to battle down the haughty, To spare the meek. Our fine arts,
> these, forever."[12]

II . The Altar of Victory

Let us next turn, making a jump from the first to the end of the fourth
century, to the issue of the Altar of Victory at the Senate House in Rome.
Thus far the thesis has been maintained that Rome incorporated into her blood
stream, as it were, an innate sense of historical destiny linked to the
political structures of society and intimately related to the Roman traditional
religious observances. It has been shown that although the political and
social conservatism of the Roman ethos has been noted all along by classical
scholars, there has, probably, been an underestimation of the depth of the

Roman sense of historic destiny. That this destiny is associated with the faithful observance of the _mores maiorum_, the traditions and usages of the ancestors, and was considered of the _esse_ of the consciousness of _Romanitas_, I have attempted to illustrate by selections from Cicero's _De Re Publica_ and Vergil's _Aeneid_.

Such an understanding of the Roman ethos sheds much light upon certain well known facts of Roman history. The antagonism of Cicero and Tacitus, for instance, to the Augustan Principate, the antagonism and scorn with which the conservative elements of Roman society treated the Near Eastern splendor of the Empire and the Emperor's Court, the hostility toward the reception of Isis and Osiris, of Cybele and her priesthood, of Mithra and the Taurabalium—all these become clear. Finally, of course, in the light of the above, the apparent contradiction between Rome's initial suppression of the Church which would not do homage to the emperor, and her later nationalization of the church as a social cement is reconciled and the underlying causes are eminently coherent.

In the crises of the Altar of Victory we see but another example of all these enduring themes of the Roman ethos. The historical background of the actual removal of the Altar of Victory is complex and not essential to a proper understanding of the issues involved. Suffice to say, the altar was placed in the Senate House in Rome early in Rome's history. As the Senate began a year's work, and perhaps at other times and festivals, they poured libations on the altar and did homage to the gods who had made Rome mistress of the Mediterranean world and a light to the nations.

The Altar of Victory was thus a symbol of _Romanitas_, Roman ways, and the Roman accomplishment, much as the memorials in Washington, D.C. symbolize both the greatness of the States and its leaders.

At the end of the fourth century, due to the ascendancy of Christianity into the stratum of political leadership in the Empire, the Altar of Victory had been removed from the Senate House. This occurred, however, just before paganism received a new impetus within the upper eschalons of the Roman bureaucracy with Symmachus made prefect of the City and Praetextatus, prefect of Italy. With these cultured and influential pagans in power, the demand for the replacement of the Altar of Victory was resumed. The argument made by these men and their pagan predecessors was, of course, that the presence of the Altar of Victory with its attendent rites assured the safety and future success of Roman life. Symmachus, in his Relatio, or request to the emperor, personified Rome as saying that in exchange for homage the Roman deities had brought Rome to greatness.

At this point, to fully appreciate the interesting complexity of the situation a digression is necessary. The Christian opponents of Symmachus, especially Ambrose, were not, as one may think, devoid of their own view of historical destiny involving the historical destiny of Rome. Ambrose, Eusebius, Prudentius and many more shared the Roman optimism of historical accomplishment and progress. The essential difference was, however, that they substituted the Christian idea of Providence for the pagan concept of the providence of the Roman deities. In other words, these Christian thinkers held the view that because the Roman Empire had officially accepted the Faith, especially after the Edict of Toleration in 313, the future of Rome was even more positive and optimistic. Tertullian put it this way: "And for all that is said, if we compare the calamities of former times, they fall on us more lightly now, since God gave Christians to the world...."[13]

And later, in the words of Eusebius as he speaks about the need for clerical preference: "So that, whilst they exhibit the greatest possible reverence to the Deity, it appears the greatest good will be conferred on the state."[14]

And, finally, Ambrose himself, writing to the Emperor Valentinus: "There can be no other assurance of prosperity than the universal and sincere worship of the true God, the Christian God, by whom all things are governed."[15]

So, here we see the pagans and Christians at logger-heads, not over the pagan concept of do ut des, duty to the Gods in return for favor, but conflict over which of the Gods will receive homage.

What has happened here, of course, is that the Latin Christians have been strongly influenced by the one of the essential elements of pagan religion and the Roman sense of historical destiny. The Christians, too, had come to the belief that what was good for the Gods was good for Rome, and that the destiny of Roman Christianity was linked intimately with the destiny of Romanitas itself. The fact that the Christians won out and the Altar of Victory was forever removed from the Senate House must not hide the matter of real importance, the fact that Christians were operating in pagan Roman thought catagories.

III. History and St. Augustine

Now we turn to the relevance of all the above to St. Augustine's writing on history. This is not the place for an exhaustive treatment, which will not be relevant until Augustine's philosophy of history itself has been described in chapters three and four. What is relevant here, in the light of this study of the Roman ethos, is an outlining of issues which confronted Augustine as he sat down to write the City of God, and perhaps deeper motives, of which even he was not aware.

First we can state that the conflict over the Altar of Victory should make apparent the crises which the 'sack' of Rome by Alaric in 410 wrought upon both the pagans and the Christians of the Roman Empire.

For the pagans, of course, the 'sack' of Rome meant two things simultaneously.

First, it was horrendously traumatic because the downfall of Rome symbolized the virtual end of the Empire and the loss of all that gave ultimate meaning to life itself. The depth of this trauma should be quite clear after what has been said above about the meaning of Romanitas in terms of the fundamental, ultimate purpose and meaning of Rome's ongoing history.

In the second place, the 'sack' of Rome more than confirmed in the pagan mind the belief that the cessation of homage to the ancestral gods had been the underlying cause of the Germanic victory.

Thus, when Augustine started his City of God this was a basic issue with which he had to come to terms , and ultimately conquer.

For the Christian, of course, the 'sack' of Rome meant the undercutting of that faith in cultural and social progress which for them was made by the intimate linking of Divine Providence and Roman destiny. Not only was the future of Rome as the bearer of the new Christian age crushed, but doubt as to the omnipotence of the Christian God must have been called into question in their minds.

Thus, when Augustine wrote his City of God this issue, facing him from within the confines of the Christian camp itself, would have to be met and dealt with effectively. Not only would the despair over the efficacy of God's Providence have to be discussed, but more fundamental than this, even, the pagan idea of do ut des and the identification of Christian Providence and Roman destiny would have to be attacked if an authentic Christian position was to be maintained. These two issues or apologetic tasks, Augustine considers in the first five books of the City of God.

In countering Christian despair over the sack of Rome, Augustine is quick to point out first that the fact that an evil person gains earthly power does not deny the power of God. Augustine writes: "Therefore that God,

the author and giver of felicity, because He alone is the true God, Himself gives earthly kingdoms both to good and bad. Neither does he do this rashly, and, as it were, fortuitously,--because He is God, not fortune,--but according to the order of things and times, which is hidden from us, but thoroughly known to Himself; which same order of times, however, he does not swear subject to it, but Himself rules as lord and appoints as governer."[16]

Turning next to counter the sub-Christian claim within the church that Christian faith assured happiness and success, Augustine remarks in another place that: "But again, lest any emperor should become a Christian in order to merit the happiness of Constantine, when everyone should be a Christian for the sake of eternal life, God took away Jovian far sooner than Julian, and permitted that Gratian should be slain by the sword of a tyrant."[17]

In addressing himself to the pagan accusation that the victory of Alaric was due to the cessation of homage from the Roman gods to the Christian God, Augustine took another approach. To the pagans Augustine showed that, first, homage to the Roman deities had not prevented harm in internal and external forms to come to Rome before Christ. He writes, probably addressing himself to Symmachus: "But remember that, in recounting these things, I have still to address myself to ignorant men; so ignorant, indeed, as to give birth to the common saying, 'Drought and Christianity go hand in hand.' There are indeed some among them who are thoroughly well-educated men, and have a taste for history, in which the things I speak of are open to their observation; but in order to initiate the uneducated masses against us, they feign ignorance of these events, which in certain places and at certain times uniformly befall mankind, are the result of Christianity, which is being everywhere diffused, and is possessed of a renown and brilliancy which quite eclipses their own gods."[18] In this book and the one following Augustine goes on to describe the

various calamities that befell Rome before Christ, stressing especially those injuries he considered the most dangerous--the corruption of manners and the vices of the soul.

Turning from the specific apologetic tasks against his fellow Christians and against his pagan opposition upon which the material presented in this chapter sheds light, it may be possible to suggest a wider application of this background material in understanding Augustine's total outlook on history.

An analysis of the Roman ethos such as the above suggests that part of the motivation of Augustine in his rejection of the Donatist Christians with their realistic eschatology could stem from his immersion in the Roman ethos. It seems at first hand, incongrous how Augustine, a native of the highly nationalistic African province of the Roman Empire should not go the way of his fellow Africans who allied themselves with the Donatist Church. Should we conclude with Dawson[19] that Augustine avoided that radical dualism between faith and culture which characterized the Donatist schism, because he needed the alliance of the Empire to bring into subjection the schismatic church which was threatening the unity of the Church? The above analysis would suggest that one of the more basic reasons of Augustine's rejection of realistic eschatology and a radical faith-culture dualism was his immersion in the Latin ethos mainly through his education and travel in Rome, and his reading of the Latin authors, especially Cicero. From this involvement with the Roman ethos with its assumption of a close relation between the social, political, and religious structures, all considered in the matrix of Roman destiny, it would be difficult for Augustine's own theological thinking about the nature, composition, and relation of the two cities not to be strongly affected. This positive attitude toward the Empire, of course, would be reinforced by the need to turn to the secular state for aid against the Donatists, but even this positive attitude itself presupposed in Augustine's mind the conviction

that the secular state could be used for the accomplishment of God's will. That the Roman ethos in which Augustine lived and thought supplied that positive attitude is the thesis of this chapter.

Moreover, an even stronger hypothesis could be suggested with substantial plausibility. Namely, given Augustine's deep penetration in Roman cultural traditions, and given the Roman sense of historical destiny as intimately related to religious and political structures in society, a hidden motivation *is suggested* for Augustine to write a new philosophy of history. The question could be put thus: Did Augustine feel compelled, perhaps unconsciously, to offer a new interpretation of history, not only to fill the vacuum left from the collapse of pagan and sub-Christian views of history, but also because, as a Latin, he himself required a world view that related religion and the political structures of society from the perspective of time and eternity? Such an hypothesis suggests itself from an analysis of the Roman ethos and therein finds strong support as well.

II. - PART TWO

Introduction

The second part of this essay consists of two chapters. The first is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the 'Creation', the second dealing with the 'Fall'. The second chapter also consists of two parts, the first considering the 'Present History', the second dealing with the 'Consummation of History.'

Although this second part is the most lengthy part of the essay its proper understanding can only come when read in the light of the first section dealing with what I have simply called the 'Background' of Augustine's philosophy of history.

The purpose of the two chapters of the first section was to set forth those elements of thought and history which are necessary, in my opinion, to understand properly not only what Augustine thought about history, but why he came to think about it at all, and, especially, why he thought the way he did about history.

Briefly I have tried thus far to demonstrate that Augustine was not concerned to set forth a theory of historical methodology, as for example R.G. Collingwood has done in The Idea of History, nor has he attempted to analyze certain patterns in the historical process, as for example, Arnold Toynbee and Spengler have done in the modern age or as Herodotus and Thucidides did in their epoch. Rather it is my thesis that Augustine is most profitably and correctly seen as one of the last in the line of great classical writers in the Latin West who was driven by certain historical events to set

forth his understanding of history both as an apologetic response to the pagan world and also in order to make the process intelligible to himself. The former of these purposes arose from the pagan criticism of Christianity and elements of paganism within Eastern and Western Christianity, whereas the latter purpose arose because Augustine was forced to assimilate peculiarly Hebraic-Christian categories about history within the philosophic and historical thought categories of the Latin ethos of which he was the last great representative.

Chapter Three in this second part sets forth two basic principles of the Christian view of history, Creation and the Fall, as Augustine understands them. Chapter Four deals with the historical situation of the present and future as Augustine understands them in the light of these two basic Christian principles.

CHAPTER THREE – Creation and the Fall *

I. <u>Creation</u>

A. "In the Beginning"

The word "beginning" for Augustine had a double significance. This double significance is an excellent "type" of the two strands of thinking which merge, at times, with dubious compatibility in Augustine's thinking about history. In its first sense the word "beginning" refers, for Augustine, to the Christ. He explains it in this way: "And now (in these opening verses of Genesis) <u>in a dark manner</u> I see the Trinity, which You are, O my God: for You, the Father <u>created heaven and earth in the Beginning</u> of our Wisdom, which is Your Wisdom, born of You, equal to You and co-eternal, Your Son."[1] The background of Christian philosophy in the West, described briefly in Chapter One should make Augustine's meaning and purpose plain here. Briefly, for Augustine as for John, the Christ was identified with the logos, the first principle of creation, through whom and in whom was and is all creation. The Christ in Christian thought conjoined by Middle and Neo-Platonic thought was identified with the arch-typal Forms which informed creation and which was the source of the structure and being of the created world. It is to this formulation that Augustine is assenting when he identifies the "beginning" with the Christ, or the Son and we have here a good example of Augustine's Neo-Platonist background being employed in his theology.

Second, by the word "beginning" Augustine means the start, the first moment of time. Augustine, in one place states his position in the following way: "But if they (pagan objectors) say that the thoughts of men are idle when they conceive infinite places, since there is no place beside the world,

we reply that by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of the past times

of God's rest, since there is no time before the world."[2]

Here, in Augustine's understanding of time we come to a crucial element

in his understanding of history, one distinctively informed by his Christian

faith and one which forces a clean break with his pagan philosophical background.

In the first chapter Augustine's general understanding of time was set forth

in the context of some classical views. Here, Augustine's understanding of

time in relation to creation will be described. Essentially, as the quotation

indicated, Augustine held that time as a thought category, as a concept, is

meaningless apart from the fact of creation. Creation and time were con-

comittant. The reason for this is described by Augustine when he says:

"And if the sacral and infallible Scriptures say that in the beginning God

created the heavens and the earth, in order that it may be understood that

He had made nothing previously—.....—then assuredly the world was made, not

in time, but simultaneously with time."[3]

The adverb, "assuredly" will not carry conviction for the reader of

this explanation unless it is remembered from the first chapter, how

Augustine's view of time had an objective dimension grounded in moving

objects. He refers to this objective dimension to time when he writes:

"For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does

not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no

change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some

creature been made,....."[4]

One of the implications of this understanding of time is that the

"life" of God is not involved with time at all since God is eternal and

unchanging while time is only a meaningful concept when related to changing

being. Moreover, it follows from the above that the question of what God

was doing before the world was started is a non-sensical question. Augustine

writes: "At no time then had You not made anything, for time itself you made. And no time is co-eternal with You, for You stand changeless; whereas if time stood changeless, it would not be time."[5]

The resulting relationship between eternity and time is thus a distinct hiatus—a clean break between the two realms. Or it might be stated, as Augustine tried to do, that the relationship of God's eternality to human time is that God is always 'abiding' in the present. Augustine describes God's eternity and man's time in these words: "Your years abide all in one act of abiding: for they abide and the years that go are not thrust out by those that come, for none pass: whereas our Years shall not all be, till all are no more."[6]

B. Creation ex inhilo

The concept of creation from nothing is a doctrine distinguishing Christianity from all of the classical cosmologies. As indicated in the first chapter on the philosophical-background "creation" was always dependent on pre-existent matter. Augustine makes a clean break from this classical philosophical tradition on this concept of creation. For him, as for the Christian tradition generally, God made the world from nothing. As Augustine was fond of saying: "God spoke and it was done."[7] In a passage which admirably reflects Augustine's rejection of the Platonic doctrine of creation he writes: "But how did You make heaven and earth? What instrument did You use for a work so mighty? You are not like an artist; for he forms one body from another as his mind chooses; his mind has the power to give personal existence to the form it perceives within itself by its inner eye and whence should it have that power unless You made it? It impresses that form upon a material already existent and having the capacity to be thus formed, such as clay or stone or wood or gold or such like. And how should these things have

come to be unless You had made them to be? It was You who made the workman his body, and the mind that directs his limbs, the matter of which he makes what he makes, the intelligence by which he masters his art and sees inwardly what he is to produce exteriorly, the bodily sense by which he translates what he does from his mind to his material, and then informs the mind of the result of his workmanship, so that the mind may judge by that truth which presides within it whether the work is well done."[8]

C. Form and Matter

Augustine's classical heritage does come clearly to the fore, however, when he employs the concepts "form" and "matter" in the texts dealing with creation. The essentially Platonic idea that creation involved the structuring and informing of a chaotic matter which was almost non-being, not in the sense of non-existence but in the sense of that which is the principle of change, by the divine ideas or forms is explicitly used by Augustine. He uses these concepts, however, in a distinctively Christian manner in that in terms of ontological status forms come before matter, but in terms of time the two are created simultaneously, or, as Augustine says, the two elements of creation are "concreated".

Of "formlessness" Augustine gives the following description: "Right reason urged that if I wished to conceive the formless, I should strip away every smallest vestige of every sort of form. But I could not do it. I should have found it easier to think that whatever is totally without form cannot exist at all, than to conceive something between form and non-being, lacking form yet not nothing, formless and almost nothing. So my mind ceased to question my spirit which was full of bodily forms which it changed and re-arranged as it willed. I fixed my mind upon the bodies themselves, and looked deeper into the mutability by which they cease to be what they were and begin to be what they were not. And it occurred to me that this transition

from one form to another might be by way of something formless, and not by way of absolute non-being."[9]

Augustine uses the analogy of the relation of sound to song to describe the ontological relationship of formlessness to form. He writes: "The sound [of a song] comes forth ordered, that it may be song. Thus, as I said, the material, which is sound, is prior to the form which is song: not prior as having the power to make it, for sound is not the maker of songs; not prior in time, for sound is not worth more than song, since song is nothing but sound, sound made beautiful. It is simply prior in origin, because the song is not formed in order that there should be a sound, but the sound in order that there should be a song."[10]

D. Immutability and Change

Immutability or changelessness had always been attributed to the Divine. Consequently in classical cosmological thought the relation between the realm of the Divine and the created, of God and the world, always had to reckon with the source of change, of mutability. As described in the first chapter, Platonism assigned the source of mutability to Space or matter, while Stoicism regarded the transformation of the elements, their "upward" and "downward" motion as the source of change.

We have seen how Augustine tried to grapple with the problem of form and formlessness along Platonic lines, but how a distinctive Christian element was supplied by the concept of "concreation".

Nevertheless, the tension between Christian theological categories is apparent in Augustine when he takes definite pains to claim both the unchange-ableness of God and the traditional Christian understanding of God as creator of both "form" (the element of structure and stabilization) and "matter" or "formlessness" (the element of change and mutability). The difficulty

of reconciling these two categories, the one of an essentialist ontology, the other of Biblical personalism is seen perhaps most clearly as Augustine emphasizes the mystery of God's Wisdom and knowledge, compared to which man has only "enlightened ignorance". Augustine states his position thus: "...are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in past eternity—God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom there is no changeableness?" the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God himself, "According to the depth of thy Wisdom Thou hast multiplied the children of men." Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but Thou has multiplied the children of men according to the depth of Thy wisdom which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will."[11]

In view of the first chapter it is important to note how Augustine consciously defends his Christian position against those pagan philosophies which deny the power of God to create absolutely in the effort to defend the motion of God's immutability. This was the general position of Platonism against which Augustine argues in the following way: "As for those [i.e. the neo-platonists] who own, indeed, that it (the world) was made by God, and yet ascribe to it not a temporal but only a creational beginning, so that in some scarcely intelligible way the world should always have existed...they make an assertion which seems to them to defend God from the charge of arbitrary hastiness...or of changing His will, though He be unchangeable. But I do not see how this supposition of theirs can stand in other respects, and chiefly in respect of the soul; for if they contend that it is co-eternal with God they will be quite at a loss to explain whence there has accrued to it a new misery, which through a previous eternity had not existed."[12]

In a similar manner Augustine defends his Christian position against those
who hold the view that there is a succession of worlds either in terms of
number (Epicurus) or a succession of worlds (Heraclitus). Augustine says
of these philosophers, "There are some, again, who though they do not suppose
that this world is eternal, are of the opinion either that this is not the only
world, but that there are numberless worlds, or that indeed it is the only
one, but that it dies, and is born again at fixed intervals, and this times
without number; but they must acknowledge that the human race existed before
there were other men to beget them."[13]

Finally, in this same vein, Augustine states and refutes the orthodox
Stoic position (Cf. Chapter One). "This controversy some philosophers have
seen no other approved means of solving than by introducing cycles of time,
in which there should be a constant renewal and repetition of the order of
nature;....—far be it, I say, from us to believe this. For once Christ died
for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dieth no more. 'Death hath no
more dominion over Him;' and we ourselves after the resurrection should be
ever with the Lord"....Augustine concludes his defense against the Stoics'
position appropriately enough when he writes: "the wicked walk in a circle;
not because their life is to recur by means of these circles, which these
philosophers imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine now
runs is circuitous."[14]

E. Seminal Reasons and Providence

Perhaps in an effort to reconcile the immutability of God's will with
the fact of change and development in the world Augustine relies on two
further elements in his thought.

The first is the idea of the seminal reasons. These were elements
characterized by humidity and partaking of the nature of number which were

created at the beginning of time. Their nature was such that they cause the change and development of things and beings in time. Gilson summarizes the function of the seminal reasons thus: ...Seminal reasons possess a principle of activity and development that is the cause of their fruitfulness.... Augustine looks upon them as numbers which bring with them for development in time the efficacious forces contained in the works of God finished before He rested on the seventh day."[15]

The most comprehensive statement which Augustine writes describing the purpose of the seminal reasons is contained in his work On the Trinity; there he writes: "For all these things in the way of original and beginning have already been created in a kind of texture of the elements, but they come forth when they get the opportunity. For as mothers are pregnant with young, so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of things that are born; which are not created in it, except from that highest essence, where nothing either springs up or dies, either begins to be or ceases."[16]

The second element which explains development and change is attributed by Augustine to the 'will of God', or Providence. It is interesting to note how a Neo-Platonic hierarchy is implied in the following description of the will of God: "But as the more gross and inferior bodies are governed in due order by the more subtle and powerful ones, so all bodies are governed by the living spirit; and the living spirit devoid of reason, by the reasonable spirit; and the reasonable living spirit that makes default and sins, by the living and reasonable spirit that is pious and just; and that by God Himself, and so the universal creature by its Creator, from whom and through whom and in whom it is also created and established. And so it comes to pass that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all corporeal appearances and motions."[17]

F. Six Days and Creation

Augustine makes a distinction between the creation of the spiritual realm and physical realm and the creation of actual physical bodies some of whom contain spiritual souls. 'In the beginning' Augustine takes to mean first the creation of a spiritual realm, namely the angels who, though they are not co-eternal with God, nevertheless are capable of adhering to the beatific vision and thus able to counteract the substratum of mutability which is part of their nature. Augustine says of the angels: Clearly the heavens of heaven which You made in the beginning [and not on any numbered day] is in some way an intellectual creature; although in no way co-eternal with You, the Trinity, it is yet partaker in your eternity. It holds its mutability in check because of the joy and delight of contemplating You; and from the moment of its creation it adheres to You with never a lapse and so escapes all the fleeting vicissitudes of time."[18] The other element of creation, before the beginning of the 'six days' was the formless matter which was described above in sub-section C. Augustine summarizes this first step in the actual process of creation in this way: "It is with reference to these two, the one formed, from the beginning, the utterly without form, the one heaven (the heaven of heavens), the other earth (the invisible formless earth) that I take it Your scripture says, without specifying the day, 'In the beginning God made Heaven and earth.'"[19] During the 'six days' Augustine recounts the process of creation. The creation of man himself occurs on the "sixth"day. In relation to the higher and lower structures of creation man is described as "man is a kind of mean between angels and beasts—the beast being an irrational and mortal animal, the angel a rational and immortal one, while man, inferior to the angel and superior to the beast, and having in common with the one, immortality, and with the other, reason, is a rational and mortal animal."[20]

In addition man is described as created from the dust of the earth: "This man, then, who was created of the dust of the earth, or of the moistened dust or clay—this "dust of the earth" (that I may use the words of Scripture) was made, as the apostle teaches, an animated body when it received the soul."[21]

Because Augustine's anthropology is important for his understanding of history, the following enumeration of the nature of man will be given. First, man's soul is superior to his body: "for man is not a body alone, nor a soul alone, but a being composed of both. This indeed is true, that the soul is not the whole man but the better part of man; and that then, when both are joined, they receive the name of man—which, however, they do not severally lose even when we speak of them singularly."[22]

Second, Augustine goes on to describe man as the image of God: "But we must understand in what sense man is said to be in the image of God, and is yet dust, and to return to the dust. The former is spoken of the rational soul, which God by his breathing, or to speak more appropriately, by His inspiration, conveyed to man, that is to his body; but the latter refers to his body which God formed of the dust, and to which a soul was given, that it might become a living body, that is man might become a living soul."[23] ←—Thus Augustine's full definition of man is "a rational soul with a mortal and earthly body in its service."[24]

Before concluding this section on the creation it is apt from the perspective of Augustine's philosophy to describe two other characteristics of the created order. The first is its goodness: and thus the divine admonishes us not foolishly to vituperate things, but to investigate their utility with care; and where our mental capacity is at fault, to believe that there is a utility, though hidden, as we have experienced that there were other things which we all but failed to discover. For this concealment of things of the

use of things is itself an exercise of our humility or a levelling of our

pride; for no nature is at all evil and this is a name for nothing but the

want of Good".[25]

Finally we must mention how Augustine finds in the Genesis account of

creation the Trinity. "Already in the word 'God' who did those things

(created heaven and earth) I recognize the Father, and in the word "Beginning"

in which He did these things I recognize the Son, and believing my God is

Trinity, following my belief, I sought in His sacred words, and behold I

found Your Spirit, moving over the waters. Thus I found the Trinity: My

God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the Creator of every creature."[26]

II. The Fall

A. The Problem of Evil

Having considered the main elements which compose Augustine's under-

standing of the order of creation the next subject to be discussed is

Augustine's conception of the Fall. This Christian doctrine clearly caused

Augustine much intellectual wrestling. The primary reason for this, there

is little doubt, arose from the general Platonic categories within which he

attempted to assimilate intellectually his Christian beliefs.

One of the great turning points of Augustine's intellectual development

occurred when he was "rescued" from the notion that the force of evil in the

world was a force having an independent existence and status over against the

power of Goodness. It was neo-platonism which provided the concept of evil

as a diminution of being, thus a negative element, a deficiency or a lack,

rather than an element of the created order having a positive ontological

status. This step in Augustine's development enabled him to assimilate the

Christian belief in a God and a world, the being of which were good insofar

as they had being. However much this neo-platonic idea facilitated Augustine's growth in Christian belief it could not remove him entirely from intellectual struggle over the problem of evil. The reason was that the neo-platonic concept of evil as deficiency of being was coherent in a cosmology which envisioned a hierarchical structure of being which decreased in its fullness the further it was removed from the ground of all being, i.e. Τὸ ὄν . In the Hebraic Christian world view, however, evil was not conceived of as deriving from a being removed in ontological status from the ground of being, but in personal categories of will and love. Thus Augustine was faced with the problem of making intellectually coherent to himself the problem of sin, stated in personalistic categories by the Christian faith, in terms of being and its deficiency, stated in impersonal ontological categories.

Generally speaking, Augustine did not attempt a formal resolution of these two dissimilar categories. Rather he stated the problem of evil and sin in terms of deficiency of being, as if there was, in fact, no conflict in these categories. But still Augustine was not out of intellectually troubled waters because he still had to face the question of the source or reason for the deficiency of being in the created order. Neo-platonism did not have to face this question because its answer was implied in the very cosmology of neo-platonism i.e. in the hierarchical structure of being. Also, Christianity in its Hebraic setting did not raise the question at all in philosophical categories, rather it supplied its answer implicitly in the mytho-poǒic categories in which the tradition described the Fall.

B. The Fall of the Angels

For Augustine, the fall of man was preceeded by the fall of a number of the intellectual beings which composed the spiritual realm. This was the Fall of the Angels and Augustine tells us that the cause of this fall was a desire

of the evil angels to contemplate a lesser good. He writes: "That the contrary

propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their

nature and origin, since God, the Good Author and creator of all essences,

created them both, but from a difference in their will and desires, it is

impossible to doubt. While some steadfastly continued in that which was the

common good of all, namely in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and

love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they could

be their own good which was common to all, and bartering the lofty dignity

of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity for the slyness

of vanity, uniting love for factious partnership, they became proud, deceived,

envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence

to God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary,

that is in their not adhering to God...."[27] In this passage we find clearly

stated the two elements which constitute Augustine's analysis of evil. The

first is the idea of contemplation of the highest good which, within the

neo-platonic context from which Augustine derived it, is an ontological non-

personal idea. The other thought category is also present i.e. will, desire

from the Hebraic-Christian tradition. In the amalgam which Augustine sets

forth here the neo-platonic categories of adherence by nature to the highest

good is translated into categories of perversity of will and desire i.e. into

the traditional Christian categories.

Augustine's struggle becomes most apparent when he is driven to supply

a cause or source of this falling away from the highest good. The incongruity

between the two sets of thought categories involved in the discussion of sin

and the fall of the angels is glossed over as Augustine explains the angels'

fall from the highest good in terms of deficiency of being. It is clear that,

at least in these passages of theoretical analysis by Augustine, the translation

from categories of deficiency of being to those of personal rebellion against God is not made and Augustine reveals his inability to make this translation most clearly perhaps as he admits his ignorance in the final analysis. The following passage gives expression to these themes: "let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being—this is to begin to have an evil will. Now to seek to discover the causes of this defection—causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient—is as if one sought to see darkness or hear silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means of the eye, the latter only by the ear; but not by their positive actuality, but by their want of it. Let no one, then, seek to know from me what I know that I do not know; unless he perhaps wishes to learn to be ignorant of that of which all we know is, that it cannot be known."[28]

C. Fall of Man

Augustine turns from his description of the Fall of the Angels to a description of the fall of the first man and woman. For Augustine the responsibility of this fall is laid primarily at the feet of the woman, but not without finding guilt in the first man as well. The following passages describe the process of the fall: "For as in the case of that visible of the two human beings who were made first, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded them to eat of it; and the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband and they eat together; although she alone spoke with the serpent, and she alone was led away by him."[29]

As Augustine goes on to describe the fall of man it is interesting to

note how he more readily speaks in the Hebraic-Christian categories of will

and pride and de-emphasizes the ontological categories which he employed

in the analysis of the fall of the angels. A good illustration of this is

found in the following passage: "Accordingly, God, as it is written, made

man upright, and consequently with a good will. For if he had not a good

will, he could not have been upright. The good will, then, is the work of'

God; for God created him with it. But the first evil will, which preceeded all

man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the works of God to

its own works than any positive work. And, therefore, the acts resulting were

evil, not having God, but the will itself for their end; so that the will or

the man himself, so far as his will is bad, was as it were the evil tree

bringing forth evil fruit."[30]

For Augustine there was an essential connection between sin, the will and

pride, as is implied in the above passage. Sin or the first fall of man, in

the final analysis was a mis-direction of the will caused by a desire to exalt

the self and not God. This capacity for falling away presupposed the will's

freedom to do so and was caused by the inordinate desire to be an end in

itself. These elements are distinctly combined as Augustine writes: Our

first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly

corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceeded

it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride?...And what is pride

but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation when the

soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind

of end to itself."[31]

In the study of Augustine's concept of the Fall of man it is possible

to delineate three major consequences it produces in the life of men. The

first of these is death, which Augustine, following the Biblical tradition,

sees as the judgment of God on man for his disobedience. Augustine speaks of two deaths, the one spiritual arising from the soul's 'lack of mooring' as it were when it turned away from dependence on God. The second death, the physical death is a consequence of the spiritual death and results in the death of the physical body itself. The following quotation links these two conceptions of death: "For in the first stirrings of the disobedient motion which was felt in the flesh of the disobedient soul, and which caused our first parents to cover their shame, one death indeed is experienced, that namely when God forsakes the soul. (This was intimated by the words he uttered, when the man, stupified by fear, had hid himself, "Adam where art thou?"-- words which He used not in ignorance of inquiry but warning him to consider where he was, since God was not with him.) But when the soul itself forsook the body, corrupted and decayed with age, the other death was experienced of which God had spoken in pronouncing man's sentence, "Earth thou art, and unto earth shalt thou return."[32]

This death of the body leads into the second consequence of the sin of the first parents which is the loss of power by the will to control and direct the passions. As a result of the fall all men were burdened by the conflict of the flesh against the spirit. Augustine writes: "For the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and indeed vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of the wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh."[33] This part of Augustine's discussion of sin is especially ambiguous because it is difficult at times to know whether or not

Augustine really did accept the flesh on a par with the spirit. In neo-platonic thought diminution of being occurred as involvement with matter took place and in this philosophy it appeared at times that evil was identified with the material world. Augustine himself describes the formless matter as the source of mutability and non-being, and thus comes very close, in principle, to defining the corporeal, mutable world with the power of non-being which counter acts the perfection of being. Since Augustine in fact, identifies evil as the lack of being, it seems that he would in principle, find it hard not to identify evil and matter. Moreover, in his sexual ethics, Augustine is very puritanical by comparison with the insights of the modern understanding and it is difficult to be sure whether Augustine is ambiguous about sexual relations because they are a necessary evil, as such, or whether it is only the inordinate lust present in sexual passion due to the corrupt will which he fears. The final analysis however, seems to show that Augustine takes the Christian position in most cases rejecting the identification of evil with matter. The following quotation indicates this position: "For he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good, and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and hatred of the flesh; for these his feelings arise from human fancy, not from divine truth."[34]

A final result of sin in the first parents is the loss of the true freedom of the will. In this part of his theology, Augustine shows his neo-platonic background quite clearly. For him, the will is always free, but is freest when it chooses the good and the true. When it falls away from this highest and attaches its affection or love on to a lesser good then the health and freedom of the will itself is impaired. This is clear when Augustine writes: The will, therefore, is truly free, when it is not the

slave of vices and sin. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it."[35]

This point is important for understanding Augustine's concept that our will is really our love, that is our highest loyalty or ultimate concern. As Augustine says, "the right will is, therefore, the well-directed love, and the wrong will is ill-directed love."[36] This leads Augustine on to the description of the fallen angels and men whose will is not for the highest, and thus whose love is for a lesser rather than an ultimate good. It is thus that we come to the classical definition of the two groups of men and angels, with which Augustine concludes his discussion of the Fall, one adhering by their will to the highest object of love, the others adhering to a lesser object of love, themselves. He writes, in what is perhaps the best known passage from the City of God: "Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord."[37]

CHAPTER IV - The Present History and the Consummation of History

A. The Present History

As has been mentioned in the introduction to the second part of this essay Augustine's approach to the meaning of history is not quite the same as that of men like Thucidides, Herodotus, Hegel, Spengler, or Toynbee. Whereas these writers attempted to assert certain generalizations about history on the basis of historical analysis, Augustine is best understood as viewing history from the standpoint of several basic theological pre-suppositions such as the doctrines of Creation and the Fall. With these in mind, he then proceeds to lay down the guide lines of thought which naturally followed from these doctrines, for a long view of the overarching principles characterizing the historical process. In parts A. and B. of this second part the nature and meaning of the basic doctrines of Creation and the Fall were described. In this third part we turn to the broad overarching principles or categories by which the present course and future end of history naturally follow. It is in chapters X-XXII of his work, the City of God that Augustine describes these principles, whereas in the second chapter we have mentioned how the first five chapters considered questions arising from the immediate historical questions raised at the time Augustine wrote his major work.

1. Israel and the Two Cities

Augustine's general approach is to identify the City of God with the history of Israel as recorded in the New Testament. The City of Man, on the other hand, is relegated to the history of all other nations. Since the first parents were the first humans to participate in the Fall away from the

highest good, namely God, it is with the children of the first parents that
the two cities take their rise. Thus it is with Cain and Abel that the earthly
course of the two cities commences. Augustine says, "Of these first parents
of the human race, then, Cain was the first born and he belonged to the
City of men; after him was born Abel, who belonged to the City of God...
when these two cities began to run their course by a series of deaths and
births, the citizen of this world was the first born, and after him the
stranger in this world, the citizen of the city of God, predestined by
grace, elected by grace, by grace a stranger below, and by grace a stranger
above."[38]

It should be noticed that here, as with the discussion of Creation and
the Fall, Augustine takes the Holy Scriptures with utmost seriousness although
he does not hesitate to exercise what we would call critical analysis when
comparing Latin and Greek texts. But, while he followed the Biblical account
minutely at times he also found room in his exegetical method for allegorical
interpretation. There are excellent examples of this treatment of the
Scriptures in his discussion of the history of the Israels, but also in his
discussion of the Creation found in the last two books of the Confessions.
Since the purpose of this essay is not to describe the historical method of
Augustine, but rather to set forth the broad principles with which he
viewed history and the philosophical and historical background which
prompted these principles, a detailed analysis of Augustine's use of Scripture
is out of place. Suffice to say that Augustine took seriously the objective
Scriptures and did not relegate these to an inferior place in exegetical
method as Origen did.

2. History and Christ

As was implied from a quotation in the discussion of Creation, the life

and death of Christ is for Augustine the hinge point between the beginning of
the two cities in their earthly representatives and the consummation of history
at the end of time. The function of Christ is described by Augustine in
several different ways. Sometimes, he adopts New Testament terminology in
saying that Christ died for our sins. At other times, Augustine's terminology
is more philosophical in tone and Christ is described as he who has the
relationship to man as eternity to time, being that Mediator between the
two realms which is required by the gulf between the eternal and temporal.
In another place Augustine seems to describe the Mediator in terms of one
who exemplified perfect adherence to God in a way that humans could com-
prehend, and thus enabled the elect to turn their gaze as it were to the true
good from lesser goods. A beautiful expression of Christ as the Mediator
is given in the following quotation, reminiscent of the washing of the
disciples' feet in the Fourth Gospel, but suggesting some of the themes
mentioned above: "For Your Word, the eternal Truth, towering above the
highest parts of Your creation, lifts up to Himself those that were cast
down. He built for Himself here below a lowly house of our clay, that by
it He might bring down from themselves and bring up to Himself those who were
to be made subject, healing the swollenness of their pride, fastening their
love: so that the deity at their feet, humbled by the assumption of our
coat of human nature; to the end that weary at last they might cast them-
selves down upon His humanity and rise again at its rising."[39]

Implicit in this passage just quoted is another element in Augustine's
understanding of the present and future history. This element is the idea
that there existed a number of the elect who would, because of the Mediator,
shift their allegiance from lesser to the highest love and thus be assured
eternal salvation. That this division between the saved and the damned is

irrevocable and predestined is unambiguously stated by Augustine, as will be made clear in the last section of this chapter. In terms of the present discussion, however, the important point to notice is that all the elements of Augustine's over-all view of history are presented. The Creation and the Fall set the historical stage as it were, and the rest of the historical process is the development of the two cities side by side beginning with Cain and Abel, until the time of the Mediator. From the time of the Mediator, i.e. Augustine's own period of history, until the consummation the fundamental issue to be seen is the continued delineation of membership in the two cities until the end. The membership in the company of the saved, the true city of God, is determined by God, and the rest are assured eternal death. In places Augustine reverts to a view of world history according to stages or periods—a view widely held in Christian speculation. The stages or epochs numbered six, patterned after the six days of creation. The first day, the period from Adam to Noah; the second, from Noah to Abraham; the third, from Abraham to David; the fourth, from David to the Dispersion; the fifth, the Dispersion period; the sixth day, Arrival of the Messiah and the second eve of the Church. The seventh day is Christ's eternal reign.

According to Augustine, the present age, from the time of Christ to the Consummation, was marked by the arrival of the Messiah. During this period the membership in the true City of God is being determined for men in the context of history. In summary of the history of the two cities at the end of book fifteen, Augustine writes: "But let us now at last finish this book, after thus far treating of, and showing as far as seemed sufficient, what is the mortal course of the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, which are mingled together from the beginning down to the end of these, the earthly one has made to herself of whom she would, either from any other quarter, or even

from among men, false gods whom she might serve by sacrifice; but she which

is heavenly and is a pilgrim on the earth does not make false gods, but

is herself made by the true God of whom she herself must be the true

sacrifice. Yet both alike either enjoy temporal good things, or are afflicted

with temporal evils, but with diverse faiths, diverse hope, and diverse love,

until they must be separated by the last judgment, and each must receive her

own end of which there is no end."[40]

In this passage it is possible to notice the double use which Augustine

makes of the words 'end'. It is used both in the sense of the ultimate concern

which distinguishes the two cities, and also in the sense of the conclusion

of time. In this double meaning is seen in a concise way/in which ontological

categories of attachment or adherence to what one considers the highest good

are combined with what is a characteristically historical or Biblical category—

the end of time.

3. Religion and Culture

It is quite clear that for Augustine, the period of the sixth epoch

lasts one thousand years. In opposition to those who held the view that the

thousand year period mentioned in Revelation referred to a reign of one

thousand years by Christ, Augustine held the view that the one thousand

years was in via, and that the end of history was destined for 1000 A.D.

This identification is seen in the following passage: "For whosoever

has not lived until the thousand years be finished, i.e. during this whole

time in which the first resurrection is going on—whosoever has not heard

the voice of the Son of God, and passed on from death to life—that man shall

certainly in the second resurrection, the resurrection of the flesh, pass

with his flesh into the second death."[41]

The question of the relations between the city of earth and the city of

God receives attention from Augustine although Figgis is correct in saying

that Augustine did not write a political or social analysis in the modern
sense. Therefore it would be an error to look in the City of God for a
Christian doctrine about the relation between Church and state since Augustine,
unlike Cyprian, was not concerned to write from that perspective. In fact
it has been well said that the state of the Roman Empire at the time when
Augustine wrote did not lend itself to a constructive political analysis or
theorizing. Such elements would be read back, in later centuries, into
Augustine's works---especially the City of God.

Given, on the other hand, the background of the Latin West which was
described in the second chapter, it is not at all surprising that Augustine
does devote many chapters to the meaning and value of Roman history, to
whether the Providence of God rules pagan as well as Christian Empires,
whether justice is the proper common element which defines a commonwealth,
and so on.

One of the first ideas Augustine makes clear in his discussion of the
relation between the two cities is that they are in fact mingled and confused
during the earthly history. This fact was mentioned in the previous passage
of Augustine, and is described here in the following way: "In this wicked
world, in these evil days, when the Church measures her future loftiness
by her present humility, and is exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows,
disquieting labors, and dangerous temptations, when she soberly rejoices,
rejoicing only in hope, there are many reprobate mingled with the good, and
both are gathered together by the gospel as in a drag net, and in this
world, as in a sea, both swim enclosed without distinction in the net,
until it is brought ashore, when the wicked must be separated from the good,
that in the good, as in His temple, God may be all in all."[42]

The last phrase of this quotation gives a valuable insight into the basic

presuppositions about God for Augustine--namely his transcendent power.
The question of who were of the church and who were not had exercised the
minds of African and Roman church leaders considerably due to the Donatist
controversy. Augustine's position about the mingling of saved and damned
within the Church differed radically from the Donatists who felt much more
capable of deciding who were to be members of God's church than Augustine
apparently did. In fact Augustine put forward the idea that even before the
coming of Christ, there were non-Israelites who were members of the City of
God, for example, mentioning Job. Augustine writes: "For in very deed there
was no other people who were specially called the people of God; but they
cannot deny that there have been certain men even of other nations who
belonged, not to earthly but heavenly fellowship, to the true Israelites,
the citizens of the country that is above."[43]

To get at the root of the relation between the two cities in a positive
sense it is necessary to return to one of the first doctrinal principles of
Augustine's theology. This is the identification which he makes between
the will and love. It will be remembered that this was the point at which
Augustine forged a link between his philosophical and ontological categories
on the one hand, and Biblical categories on the other. It was by identifying
the desire in man to will the best for himself, to strive for happiness,
with man's love for the highest good (as he sees it) that Augustine sees the
connection between ontology and the Bible. This link is closed securely if
it is also admitted that the concept of _eros_ or the desire to possess the
highest good possesses intellectual as well as sensual elements in it.
Augustine, with his Greek heritage, in the neo-platonic tradition, would
have naturally made this identification, although we in modern thought have
practically excluded all elements of the intellect from our understanding of
the idea of _eros_. It follows from this that the citizens of the two cities

not only were intermingled in this world's history but basically were united
in at least two essential respects and thus intimately unified in at least
certain basic ways.

Augustine makes one of these basic elements of unification between the
two cities by first criticizing Cicero's concept of a commonweal and proposing
a new one. Cicero, in his De Re Publica had offered the concept of justice
as that which bound a group of men in a republic or commonwealth. Augustine
took issue with this definition, however, by making the observation that it
excluded not only the present Roman Empire, but most other groups from its
definition, for he writes: "Thus, where there is not true justice there can
be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgement of right,
and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and
if no people, then no weal of the people, but only some promiscuous multitude
unworthy of the name of people."[44] Augustine goes on to suggest the far
more profound definition of a people in one of those few chapters in which
Augustine could truly be said to be theorizing. He writes: "But if we
discard this definition of a people, and assuming another, say that a people
is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement
as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of
any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves,
if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings, and not of beasts,
and is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it
is bound together by lower. According to this definition of ours, the
Roman people is a people, and its weal is without a commonwealth or republic."[45]

This definition, not only profound in terms of a social analysis, is also
important as a base from which to relate the earthly city to the heavenly
city, or in modern terminology, relating religion and culture.

A primary point which Augustine presents in relating the two cities is
the dissimilarity in their two loves. No matter how engrossed Augustine

becomes at times about the relation between religion and culture, no matter

how much he betrays a sheer delight in the natural and social world as such,

his overwhelming emphasis is upon the dissimilarity between the two cities

and this fact should not be overlooked as we move on to describe certain

elements of relation. Augustine describes this dissimilarity succinctly

in the following passage where he puts forth the heavenly city's idea of

the supreme good over against the pagan notion of the fulfillment of man's

natural and social capacities: "If, then, we be asked what the city of God

has to say upon these points and, in the first place, what its opinion

regarding the supreme good and evil is, it will reply that life eternal

is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain

the one and escape the other we must live rightly."[46] Such is Augustine's

reaction to his analysis of Varro's conclusion about what philosophers

think comprises happiness. Augustine accepts the idea that happiness indeed

is the goal for all men, because all men would agree that they desire

happiness. But Augustine's position is that the man whose mind and heart

are not corrupted and who has received God's grace will see that true

happiness comes only by indentification with the ends of the heavenly city,

and that if one's love is for less than this, a lower good, then unhappiness

is the only possible result.

Augustine does not, however, put forth the view that the present life,

even for those who are 'sojourning in a foreign and hostile land' i.e. the

members of the heavenly city will find happiness in this life. As an

example of this insight, and also one showing Augustine's sensitivity to

the ambiguities of historical existence, he writes the following about

the tensions in the life of a judge: "Thus the ignorance of the judge

frequently involves an innocent person in suffering. And what is still more

unendurable—a thing indeed to be bewailed, and, if possible to be watered
with fountains of tears—is this, that when the judge puts the accused to
the question; that he may not unwittingly put an innocent man to death, the
result of this lamentable ignorance is that this very person, whom he tortured
that he might not condemn him if innocent, is condemned to death both tortured
and innocent."[47]

Having established the basic link between religion and culture, noting
their difference in their two loves, and the confusion and ambiguity between
religion and culture it is possible to note two other links between the two.

The first of these links between the two cities is the quest for peace
by each. This follows naturally from the previous idea that each person,
no matter which city he identifies himself with seeks happiness and that
this is the same as seeking peace since the latter is a basic drive for all
of the creation. Augustine writes "But as man has a rational soul, he
subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace
of his rational soul, that his intellect may have some free play and may
regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony
of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the
rational soul."[48] This being the case, Augustine suggests that both cities
strive for peace, and that even the wars and antagonisms of the earthly
city are pursued for the peace it will bring in the future, which peace the
earthly city mistakenly hopes will bring happiness such as the heavenly city
will enjoy. Furthermore, both cities enjoy each others peace, the city
of God participating in and profiting from the peace of the earthly city
as the Roman Empire provided peace and stability for the wide dissemination
of the Christian Gospel. Augustine writes: "Yet even this people has a peace
of its own which is not to be lightly esteemed, though indeed, it shall not

in the end enjoy it, because it makes no good use of it before the end. But it is our interest that it enjoys this peace meanwhile in this life; for as long as the two cities are commingled, we also enjoy the peace of Babylon. For from Babylon the people of God is so freed that it meanwhile sojourns in its company."[49]

A final link between the two cities is the set of virtues which each attempt to follow, though for different ends. While the heavenly city pursues right action to promote and be in accordance with the heavenly city the earthly city pursues its virtues to achieve glory. But in either case virtue is pursued, and the underlying reason is that both cities seek an end which transcends themselves, even if one is the ultimate good and the other is a lesser good. On the value of Roman history, then, Augustine writes: "And, therefore, it was not only for the sake of recompensing the citizen of Rome that her empire and glory had been so signally extended, but also that the citizen of that eternal city, during their pilgrimmage here, might diligently and soberly contemplate these examples, and see what a love they owe to the supernal country on account of life eternal, if the terrestrial country was so much beloved by its citizens on account of human glory."[50] And then in the next chapter Augustine continues in this same vein: "But let us avail ourselves even of these things of the kindness of God. Let us consider how great things they despised, how great things they endured, what lusts they subdued for the sake of human glory, who merited that glory, as it were, in reward for such virtues; and let this be useful to us, even in supressing pride...if in order to obtain it they (the Romans) have done some good works or endured some evils, when those men for this terrestrial country already obtained, did such great things, suffered such great things."[51]

Finally he expresses a kind of fundamental harmony, a bond of unification
which the concepts of love, peace, and virtue express. He summarizes the
relation between the two cities, between religion and culture by saying:
"Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly
city, though it has already received the price of redemption, and the
gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws
of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of
this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both
cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it.[52]

B. The Consummation of History

Augustine's description at the end of history is the logical conclusion
to the direction of present history in the light of the order of Creation
and the Fall. Augustine first states that judgement has been going on since
the beginning of time, as well as something which comes at the end. He
writes: "And when we speak of the day of God's judgement, we add the word last
or final for this reason, because even now God judges, and has judged from
the beginning of human history."[53] Augustine means by this judgement within
history the exclusion of the fallen angels from the beatific vision forever,
as well as the unhappiness and disunity of the present history, and finally
death of the mortal body. In the light of this Augustine suggests that the
final judgement will rectify the injustices of this present life and make
clear the nature of the judgements meted out in the present life: "we shall
then recognize the justice of all God's judgements, not only such as shall
then be pronounced, but of all which take effect from the beginning, or may
take effect before that time."[54] Augustine's position about the commingling
of the two cities in history and the double sense of judgement leads him

to the conclusion that in one sense the kingdom of God is already achieved, but that its unambiguous manifestation awaits the final judgement. He writes: "Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter, and yet, though the tares grow in the Church along with the wheat, they do not reign with Him."[55]

Augustine conceives the actual process of judgement in terms of two separate "resurrections." The first, or spiritual resurrection, occurs to those belonging to the heavenly city when their soul is redeemed at the time of death. The second resurrection occurs at the end of history when the bodies of the righteous receive spiritual bodies, while the souls of the dead join with their bodies for eternal punishment. Augustine writes: "For the 'hour is coming and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live' i.e. shall not come into damnation; which is called the second death; into which death, after the second or bodily resurrection, they shall be hurled who do not rise in the first or spiritual resurrection."[56] It is at this second resurrection that the final and irrevocable division is made between those predestined by God's grace for eternal life and those condemned by God's righteousness for eternal suffering. For "when this diversity between the rewards and punishments which distinguish the righteous from the wicked shall appear under that Sun of righteousness in the brightness of life eternal--a diversity which is not discerned under the sun which shines on the vanity of this life--then shall there be such a judgement as has never before been."[58]

As a result of this division the life of the city of God will be radically transformed from the nature of its historical existence. In the first place the total structure of men's will will be changed such that he will always

desire the highest good, "for the first freedom of the will which man received when he was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin; whereas this last freedom of the will shall be superior, inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin."[59]

Second, mankind will be united fully in the life of the angels who have retained the beatific vision even as now, the city of God is able to belong "to those angels with whom we shall enjoy that holy and most delightful city of God of which we have now written so much."[60]

Finally, Augustine proclaims a new heaven and a new earth that will appear in the complete manifestation of the city of God: "For as soon as those who are not written in the book of life have been judged and cast into eternal fire--the nature of which fire, or its position in the world or universe, I suppose is known to no man, unless perhaps the divine Spirit reveals it to someone--then shall the figure of this world pass away in a conflagration of universal fire, as once before the world was flooded with un_iversal water. And by this universal conflagration the qualities of the corruptible elements which suited our corruptible bodies shall utterly perish, and our substance shall receive such qualities as shall, by a wonderful transmutation, harmonize with our immortal bodies, so that, as the world itself is renewed to some better thing, it is fitly accommodated to men, themselves renewed in their flesh to some better thing."[61]

III. - PART THREE

Conclusion - Augustine's Achievement

In appraising Augustine's achievement regarding the philosophy of history we may again examine his thought against the backdrop of this own past. The first two chapters of this essay dealt with the background itself, first the broad sweep of the Greek philosophical heritage to which Augustine was heir, then second the more immediate Roman ethos which called forth and strongly influenced his historical outlook. Having seen in chapters two and three the basic content of Augustine's view of history, we may fruitfully look again at Augustine against this Greek and Roman heritage.

Regarding the Greek background, the essential aspect to be noticed is that Augustine's Christian faith provided him with a world view which made a philosophy of history possible. Before his time, at least in terms of Greek philosophy such a world view was impossible. C.N. Cochrane has described the situation very well when he calls the basic Greek presupposition defined by the _ratio-scientia_. That is the Greek thinker, whether philosopher or artist automatically set himself as observer over against the "world" to be analyzed, and this was and is the presupposition of the 'scientific outlook'. Philosophically speaking this assumption of the _ratio-scientia_ as the way to knowledge resulted in a double bifurcation in Greek thought. The first bifurcation may be described as the gulf between Being and Becoming or between the Ideal and the Actual. According to the 'scientific outlook' the self stands over against the world as seeks to 'make sense of it'. This led philosophically to the quest for a principle of order by which to understand the meaning of the 'world' in which one lives and over against which one stands.

In the philosophical development of Greece one may point to the early pre-socratic philosophy as representing that quest. The logical and chronological culmination of this quest could be said to have been arrived at in the work of Parmenides where Being was the principle of order. At this point, however, came the moment of crisis since such a principle or order threatened to relegate the world of becoming to a position of insignificance or meaninglessness. The work of Zeno and Melissus marks the point where this crisis point emerged, and the compromise systems of the later pre-socratic philosophers, and finally Plato emerged. These philosophers sought a third principle by which to relate the orders of Being and Becoming.

In Plato this third principle was the idea of participation in the transcendent Forms which gave a degree of order and being to the world of becoming. The limitations of this third principle in Plato were seen by both Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom sought to overcome these limitations by negating the transcendent element which characterized Plato's understanding of the Forms. In Stoicism and Epicureanism the third principle by which to relate the worlds of Being and Becoming were drawn from the compromise systems of the last pre-Socratics. But in all of these cases the problem was never solved of how the _ratio scientia_, the scientific outlook, could overcome the gulf between the two worlds, the Ideal and the Actual, Being and Becoming. The result of this gulf was that the world of Becoming, the time-space world of history of political action and decision lost the dimension of ultimacy. In literary works this gulf and its devaluation of the order of becoming manifested itself in the way characters in the drama lack the capacity for responsible action and decision. In art, this gulf was manifested in the loss of the individuality of persons and events in favor of the ideal. In historical writing the gulf is manifested in the

lack of over-arching purpose in the historical process, the domination of
historical activity by chance and Fortune, and the loss of significance
of events for their own sake, in favor of recurrent universal principles
of historical forces which individual people and events merely exemplify.

A second gulf or separation resulted from the assumption of the
'ratio scientia' and the 'scientific outlook' as the means to knowledge.
This division or split occurred in the Greek understanding of man. Generally
speaking, the division was between that part of man which was involved in the
world of becoming, the passions and the intellect which concerned the world
of change and motion, and between the part of man which was akin to the
principles of Being and the Ideal. Occasionally in the pre-Socratics, in
Plato, especially in Middle and late Stoicism, and in Middle and Neo-Platonism,
this implicit dualism manifested itself in the suspicion with which involvement
in worldly activity was regarded and in its clearest form, when the body was
regarded as a burden to the soul in its quest for union with the world of
Being and ecstatic union with the Divine beyond Being.

Perhaps the best way to understand Augustine's achievement is to see
the way he, in large measure, overcame the two gulfs of the Greek heritage,
and so to speak, made man both feel at home in his world, and also at one
within himself.

Following Cochrane again, Augustine overcame the gulfs created by the
implicit assumption of the ratio scientia by his idea of ratio sapientia,
substituting wisdom for reason as the means of true knowledge. Such a
substitution had as its source Augustine's Christian faith, especially the
doctrine of the Trinity, which was for him the beginning and end of all
truth. In the last chapters of his work, the Confessions, and in his work,
On the Trinity, Augustine presents an understanding of God as Trinity, such

that man is conceived as bearing the image of this Trinity, and in some way
linked at the deepest levels of his life to God. As was shown in the first
and third chapters, Augustine's understanding of the Christian doctrine of
creation enabled him to consider what we have called the 'Space' and 'Time'
elements of existence on the same level of importance. This understanding
of the creation, united with an understanding of man as God's creature and
bearing the image of God himself were the Christian elements with which
Augustine largely overcame the gulf between self and the world and the gulf
between the 'body' and 'soul' which frustrated Greek thought. The first
gulf was overcome by Christian _ratio sapientia_ in that by it, the self was
no longer considered over against the world but along with the world
such that both were seen as the benificent creation of God. The principle
of understanding was no longer sought for in the world alone, but beyond
the self and the world in God the Trinity. With the Providence of God seen
as His righteous and gracious will for the created order, the self was no
longer a lone individual set over against a capricious Fate or Fortune,
a view which threatened always to result in dogmatism or skepticism.

The principle of _ratio sapientia_ was for Augustine the manner in which
knowledge of God and hence of the self and the world began in and through
the soul to its depth which was illuminated by the Trinity. By this principle
therefore, not only was the hiatus between the self and the world overcome,
but concomitantly the division between the 'soul' and 'body' was overcome.
For Augustine, in principle at least, the body was not a burden for the
soul, dragging it constantly toward the realm of non-being and chaos. The
soul and the body, in Augustine's thought were both created by God and had
eternal value. The passions and desires of the body were in themselves
not the cause of sin, but the manifestation of sin. With the unification

of the self in Augustine, man as a responsible whole person became the subject of consideration, not a man divided against himself; body vs. soul, as was the persistent implication of much Greek anthropology. For the first time in the history of thought the concept of the 'personality' became possible, and Augustine was able to, in fact, found his whole historical analysis on the two fundamentals of the personality—love and the will. The nature of these two elements, the will and love, was the basis which divided the two Cities, as was seen in chapters three and four. It was with this kind of Christian anthropology based ultimately on the ratio sapientia that Augustine was able to view history both in terms of abstract principles as well as with acute perception regarding the nature of societies and empires.

The degree to which Augustine's historical sense, in the terms just described was fostered and abetted by the Roman sense of active participation in the political life of the Republic and Empire, along with its perspective of eternal destiny is difficult to state categorically. Certainly it can be said that the influence was profound, if only by comparing Augustine with a thinker such as Origen for whom, in terms of the metaphors of Chapter One, 'Space' dominated 'Time' to a significant degree. Why Augustine should assimilate into his writings the strong historical sense and perspective of the Old Testament, with the eschatological stress of the New Testament to a high degree compared with the Greek Fathers, is explainable only, it seems, in terms of this Roman ethos discussed in Chapter Two.

The pervasive influence of this ethos finds further support when it is remembered the extent to which Augustine was heir to the Platonist tradition. This tradition, especially in the Neo-Platonic forms which influenced Augustine, had such a strong 'vertical', ontological emphasis, and so weakly considered

the "horizontal", historical dimension. This is not to say that in Augustine the ontological did not often threaten to overcome the historical. It was noted at the end of Chapter One how 'Space' often threatened to overcome 'Time' in the terms of our metaphor. This is apparent in the way Augustine's analysis of sin and the Fall is considered in terms of being and its deficiency— especially in the texts dealing with the fall of the angels. However it is interesting to note again—and here the Roman ethos may be the cause—how Augustine changes his categories from the ontological to the historical when he deals with the fall of man and the dynamics of the two Cities in terms of will and love. On the other hand it cannot be denied that Augustine occasionally does seem to revert back to the Middle and Neo-Platonic ideas when he talks of sin mainly as rooted in the passions of the flesh as he does in Marriage and Concupiscence.

Despite these strong elements of Platonic influence manifest throughout the Augustinian corpus the historical dimension is never lost. Social solidarity in terms of the two Cities and the perspective of the historical with a definite beginning in Creation and end in Judgement with the decisive temporal coming of the Mediator is never lost. And it was this historical perspective, stated in terms of the Christian categories of time and eternity which established the basic pattern for the Western historical development, and determinative for Christendom today.

The extent to which the dynamic aspects of Western history—the persistent reforming and transforming forces characteristic of our history— are implicit in the historical thought of Augustine is beyond the scope of this essay. It would seem that Augustine's emphasis that the composition of the two Cities are predestined by God would tend to negate ideas which fostered the transformation of the City of Man by the City of God. Does it not seem that Augustine's strict predestination would explicitly deny attempts

to relate 'religion' and 'culture'? These reforming and transforming efforts, however, constantly did appear not only in radical forms in the monastic and heretical movements, in terms of the conflict between Pope and Emperor, and in the whole medieval quest which culminated in the synthesis of the high Middle Ages.

On the other hand, the question can be raised as to how much the conservative and even static nature of Catholic orthodoxy and hierarchical structure which developed during this same period until the Reformation was implied in Augustine's implicit dualism of the Two Cities. In the final analysis, perhaps, the historical dynamism of our Western development must be traced to the Christian evaluation of 'Time' inherent in Augustine which overcame those elements of his thoughts which would tend to make 'Time' subordinate to 'Space'. If such is the case, we are called back behind Augustine to seek our answers in the nature of the gospel itself, the source of Augustine's faith and ours.

Finis

1. For the use of this metaphor see, Tillich, <u>The Meaning of History</u>, pp. 243-244; T. Driver, <u>Sense of History</u> pp. 19-38; and W. Jaeger, <u>Paideia</u> I, xxi-xxli; T. Boman, <u>Greek Thought Compared with Hebrew</u> p. 160.

2. Examples of this opposition are found in Odyssey I, 75-80; V, 281ff; XXIII, 210ff; VII, 194ff.

3. Hesiod, <u>Works and Days</u>, l. 109ff.

4. Cf. Zenophanes of Colophon, Fragments: 23-26. Cf. Freeman, <u>Ancilla</u>.

5. Heraclitus, Fragments: 88, 67, 6, 91.

6. Ibid. 30, 51, 90.

7. Parmenides, Fr. 7, 8.

8. Empedocles, Fr. 17, 22, 21.

9. Ibid. 17, 21, 29, 27, and 7.

10. <u>Timaeus</u>, 37D.

11. Diogenes Laertes, VII, 140ff.

12. Sextus Empiricus II, 166-169.

13. Maritain in <u>Monument to S. Augustine</u>, p. 58.

14. Barrow, <u>Introduction to Augustine City of God</u>, Appendix II.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. S. Dill, _Roman Society_, Vol. I, p. 78.

2. Barrow, R.H.: _The Romans_, p. 10

3. _Ibid._ p. 144

4. _De Re Publica_, I, ii, 3
   It is generally affirmed that much Middle-Stoic material is contained
   in the writings of Cicero, especially that of Panaeteus.

5. _De Re Publica_, I, **xx**, 33

6. _Ibid._, II, xiv. 27

7. _Ibid._ II, xvi, 30

8. _Ibid._ II, xxxi, 55

9. _Ibid._, VI, xiii, 13

10. Book IV, p. 101, Scribner Ed.

11. _Ibid._ VI, p. 159

12. _Ibid._ VI, p. 173

13. Apology XI

14. Ecc. History, Book 10, 7

15. Ep. 17

16. dcD. IV 33

17. _Ibid._ V, 25

18. _Ibid._ II, 3

19. Monument to S. Augustine p. 57

1. Conf. XIII.V also XI.VIII, IX. Also XII, XX.

2. dcD. XI.V

3. dcD. XI.VI

4. dcD. XI. VI

5. Conf. XI.XIV

6. Conf. XI.XIII

7. Conf. XI.V

8. Ibid. also De. Nat. Boni XXVI and Conf. XII.7

9. Conf. XII.6, also XII 20-29, XII.7

10. Conf. XII.29. Cf also, Conf. XIII,33

11. dcD. XII,XIV, also Cf. XI.IV

12. dcD. XI.IV

13. dcD. XII.II

14. dcD. XII.XIII

15. Gilson, Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, p. 206.

16. On the Trinity III.IX

17. Ibid. III.IV

18. Conf. XII.9

19. Conf. XII.13

20. dcD. IX.13

21. dcD. XIII.24

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. On the Morals of the Catholic Church, I.27

25. dc D. XI.22 cf. also XI.22

26. Conf. XXX.4

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* De Civitas Dei will be abbreviated in these notes to dcD.

27. XII.I also XII.6

28. XII.7 dcD.

29. XII.I On the Trinity

30. dcD. XIV.II

31. dcD. XIV.13

32. dcD. XIII.15, also XIII.3

33. XIV.III dcD.

34. dcD. XIV.5

35. dcD. XIV.II

36. XIV.7 Ibid.

37. XIV.28 Ibid.

38. IV.I

39. Conf. VII.18

40. dcD. XVIII.54

41. dcD. XX.9

42. dcD. XVIII.9

43. dcD. XVIII.47

44. dcD. XIX.21

45. dcD. XIX.24

46. dcD. XIX.4

47. dcD. XIX.6

48. dcD. XX.13

49. dcD. XIX.26

50. dcD. V.16

51. dcD. V.17

52. dcD. XIX.17

53. dcD. XX.I

54. dcD. XX.II

55. XX.9 dcD.

56. XX.6 dcD.

57. XXI.17 dcD.

58. XX.27 dcD.

59. XXII.30 dcD.

60. dcD. XXII.29

61. dcD. XX.16

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